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PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE

AN ADDRESS

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DECEMBER 21, 1915, AND BEFORE THE
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ON JANUARY 27, 1916

BY

HON. WALTER L. FISHER

FORMER SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

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PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE.¹

WALTER L. FISHER, former Secretary of the Interior.

Half truths are dangerous because the element of truth which they contain carries conviction and easily leads to its application far beyond the real significance to which it is entitled. We are at present in grave danger of just such a misconception of one of the most prevalent statements with regard to military preparation. The sentiment of this country is undoubtedly opposed to militarism. Our ideals and purposes are peaceful. No imperialistic propaganda could hope to succeed if its character and purposes were understood. The agitation for increasing our military forces is as a whole genuinely peaceful in its purpose. Certainly it makes its great appeal upon the ground that preparation for war is essential for the preservation of peace. The proverbs of the ancients and the utterances of our early Presidents are the mottoes it repeats: *Si vis pacem para bellum*, "If you wish peace prepare for war."

And undoubtedly in a world where selfishness and greed and lust of power still move the mass and the rulers of men to the extent they do to-day, where force is still believed to constitute a necessary if not a proper means of advancing national interests and national ideals, military preparation against war is an essential for securing peace. But there is real danger that we shall be misled—or may deceive ourselves—into believing that preparation for war is the most important thing for us if we desire to secure our own peace and to promote the peace of the world. Nothing, it seems to me, could be more unfortunate than such a result. If we wish peace, the most important thing is not to prepare for war—although that we should do. If we wish *peace*, the most important—the all-important—thing is to prepare for *peace*; to do the things that make for peace and that promote peace, not the things that make for war and promote war. And yet these peaceful measures are the things that are receiving scant attention.

I am led to present to you some thoughts upon this subject because the significance of the great war in which the larger part of the civilized world is now engaged is the one absorbing interest of our whole intellectual life. I have no thought that I shall say things that have not been better said by others—that I have anything original to impart. I am moved by a deep conviction that mankind is struggling with destiny as it has seldom struggled before, and that it is the duty of every man and woman—and especially of every educated man and woman—to think of this world war, its causes, and its probable results; and, as his thoughts become at all definite, to express them, if it be only in confirmation of, or dissent from, the

¹ Delivered (in part) as an address on the occasion of the Ninety-seventh Convocation of the University of Chicago held in Leon Mandel Assembly Hall, December 21, 1915. Delivered on January 27, 1916, before the Industrial Club of Chicago.

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views expressed by others which are likely to affect public opinion and public action. It is a time for each human being, in humility and sincerity, to ask himself: "What do I think? What is the explanation of this appalling catastrophe and what is to follow it? What should and what can I, in my tiny circle of possible action, do to help, if ever so little, toward a right solution of the problems it presents?"

What might be called its purely academic interest is greater than any other interest of the student. It pervades the library and the laboratory, the classroom and the lecture hall, and the quiet cloisters of the university. What a compelling stimulus to intellectual activity it is; what a zest it adds to all our studies in physical, political, social, and economic science; to what fierce tests it is subjecting our theories of human progress and social evolution!

There is nothing, indeed, so instructive, so absorbing, so essential for us—as individuals and as a nation—to understand as the mighty conflict that is now going on: its causes and its consequences, its horrors and its folly. It is important for all of us to appreciate the reality of its horror. But I am not qualified to picture this horror if I would, and this is not the place or the occasion. It is fitting, however, for us to consider its folly, and how we in the future may escape such folly. "Wisdom is the principal thing; therefore get wisdom: and with all thy getting get understanding."

There is a call for the public service of educated men and women such as has not been heard in the world since the French Revolution. For we must go back to France and the Napoleonic era for any such epochal events as are happening in the world to-day. It is quite possible, perhaps it is exceedingly probable, that the actual consequences upon our whole intellectual, social, political, and economic outlook that will follow and result from this war will be greater than those that followed even that great upheaval of civilized society. It is only as we understand how fundamental are the issues that are forced upon us that we shall meet those issues intelligently and wisely. Our danger, and the danger of Europe, is that we shall see its causes and effects superficially and shall devise superficial remedies and adopt a superficial settlement. There are so many essentially superficial phases of the situation that are nevertheless so important and so compelling in their interest that we can all be forgiven for misconceiving their relative importance compared with the deeper issues; but it is only as we find and face these deeper issues of transcendent consequence that we shall work good out of this awful evil that has fallen on mankind.

Already the danger of one great folly from a superficial view of this war has become apparent, and that is that we shall think of it as due to and as an exhibition of ruthless military power: that it is due to what is called Prussianism, and that if we could just curb and destroy Prussianism the world could go on quite satisfactorily, upon the whole, and without any serious or fundamental disturbance of the established social, political, economic, and intellectual order. No mistake could be made so disastrous to the future peace and progress of mankind as this. Even if the Prussian war god sits the saddle in Germany to-day, waging war with a ruthlessness that appalls mankind and an efficiency that compels its admiration, nevertheless, how

pitiful would be the conclusion that what appalls us is not war, but merely the ruthlessness and efficiency with which it is made.

It was an American thinking of war in America who said that "War is hell!"—not German war or English war or Russian war, but war, wherever waged or by whatever nation. There was never a great war waged that did not produce all the atrocities of this war, on one side or on both. The scale of the atrocities may be greater, as the scale of this war is greater. Even the doctrine of frightfulness is a doctrine that has been defended and practiced by every nation, even our own, within such limits and under such conditions as each nation has determined for itself at the time and according to its exigency as it saw it. There are few follies equal to the folly of imagining that war can be made humane.

Our own "Instructions for the government of armies of the United States in the field" (General Orders, No. 100, 1863), issued under Abraham Lincoln, the most humane of Presidents, and again issued without modification during the War with Spain in 1898, announced:

To save the country is paramount to all other considerations.

And—

18. When the commander of a besieged place expels the noncombatants in order to lessen the number of those who consume his stock of provisions, it is lawful, though an extreme measure, to drive them back, so as to hasten on the surrender.

19. Commanders, whenever admissible, should inform the enemy of their intention to bombard a place, so that the noncombatants, and especially the women and children, may be removed before the bombardment commences. But it is no infraction of the common law of war to omit thus to inform the enemy. Surprise may be a necessity.

No matter how clear the evidence may seem to some of us to-day, we are too near the event to be sure of our perspective. We must not forget how often "knowledge comes, but wisdom lingers." Even if we make certain that Serbia was the occasion, not the cause, of this war: that Germany had prepared for "the day" and that she chose the day which she thought was most favorable to her; that she, and no other, precipitated this horrible cataclysm of cruelty and destruction—even if we spare whatever nation is responsible, no part of the just condemnation of mankind for touching the match to the powder that had been so assiduously laid throughout Europe and that needed only the match—how blind, how pitifully and perversely blind, we should be not to recognize that the fundamental error consisted in having a state of international relations that was prepared for the match; that the fundamental responsibility, deeper than Prussianism, was with the nations that built and maintained their civilizations over a powder magazine! Without now discussing whether any other basis of internationalism is practicable than the basis of national armament and of military force, how foolish, how unfair, to say that in a society of nations based on force that nation which acquires and uses the greatest and the most efficient force is exclusively to blame for an explosion that leads to a test of force! The matured and distant judgment of mankind will be little concerned with awarding praise or blame on the basis of the relative extent or efficiency of military preparation, or even of the relative ruthlessness with which military force was used in a state of society based on

force and on the use of force to secure or to retain the right to exploit other lands and peoples.

The truth is that the really great differences between the warring nations are only differences of degree—degrees of militarism, degrees of democracy, degrees of political and economic intelligence. I do not minimize these differences. So gigantic is the scale on which the world movement proceeds that these differences of degree become of huge dimensions and importance when the diverging lines are projected into the expanded field of action. In war, international differences are centrifugal. Chasms widen as the circumference of the conflict expands and the conflict becomes more intense. War distorts and exaggerates and intensifies every difference of national feeling, every national misunderstanding. If, however, it be true that Germany is more militaristic than England or France or Russia or Italy, it is true only as a statement of the degree in which each of these nations has been and is militaristic. If it be true that Germany believes that she has a national ideal and peculiar national interests—political, economic, intellectual—which can be advanced by military force, the same thing is true of each of her rivals. If it be true that militarism in Germany is a menace to the world, it is also true that militarism in the rest of Europe is a menace to the world. Does Germany believe that she has a peculiar mission to perform in the unfolding of civilization, that her form of political organization, her economic and intellectual processes, offer the greatest assurance of human progress, and that it is her duty as well as her right to impose this *kultur* on the world? England has been obsessed by the same megalomaniac folly. So have we. If, happily, we are less sure that we are the people, and that wisdom is in danger lest it die with us, can we claim anything more than that we have seen the futility of such egotism, ever so little sooner and ever so little more clearly than some others? Are John Bull and Brother Jonathan types of modest self-effacement and humility before the slowly unfolding secrets of the universe?

We have been reading much of the lords and prophets of war in Germany: but have they uttered anything more frankly militaristic than Lord Roberts, "Little Bobs," the military idol of Great Britain?

How was this Empire of Britain founded? War founded this Empire—war and conquest! When we, therefore, masters by war of one-third of the habitable globe, when we propose to Germany to disarm, to curtail her navy or diminish her army, Germany naturally refuses; and pointing not without justice to the road by which England, sword in hand, has climbed to her unmatched eminence, declares openly or in the veiled language of diplomacy, that by the same path, if by no other, Germany is determined also to ascend! Who amongst us, knowing the past of this nation, and the past of all nations and cities that have ever added the luster of their name to human annals, can accuse Germany or regard the utterance of one of her greatest a year and a half ago [or of General Bernhardi three months ago] with any feelings except those of respect?

Norman Angell, in his recent book on *America and the New World State*, has collected this and many other quotations which demonstrate that there is an "Anglo-Saxon Prussianism" which differs only from German Prussianism in the extent to which it has attained popular support or official power. And yet it was the bitter complaint of Bernhardi and Trietschke that their ideas had so little influence among the people or in official circles. The most interesting

to me of all Angell's quotations is that from the Belgian author, Doctor Sarolea, who, in his book on *The Anglo-German Problem*, says:

What is even more serious and ominous, so far as the prospects of peace are concerned, the German who knows that he is right from his own point of view, knows that he is also right from the English point of view; he knows that the premises on which he is reasoning are still accepted by a large section of the English people. Millions of English people are actuated in their policy by those very imperialistic principles on which the Germans take their stand. After all German statesmen are only applying the political lessons which England has taught them, which Mr. Rudyard Kipling has sung, and Mr. Chamberlain has proclaimed in speeches innumerable. Both the English Imperialist and the German Imperialist believe that the greatness of a country does not depend mainly on the virtues of the people, or on the resources of the home country, but largely on the capacity of the home country to acquire and to retain large tracts of territory all over the world. Both the English Imperialist and the German Imperialist have learned the doctrine of Admiral Mahan, that the greatness and prosperity of a country depend mainly on sea power. Both believe that efficiency and success in war is one of the main conditions of national prosperity.

Now as long as the two nations do not rise to a saner political ideal, as long as both English and German people are agreed in accepting the current political philosophy, as long as both nations shall consider military power not merely as a necessary and temporary evil to submit to, but as a permanent and noble ideal to strive after, the German argument remains unanswerable. War is indeed predestined, and no diplomatists sitting round a great table in the Wilhelmstrasse or the Ballplatz or the Quai d'Orsay will be able to ward off the inevitable. It is only, therefore, in so far as both nations will move away from the old political philosophy that an understanding between Germany and England will become possible. * * * It is the ideas and the ideals that must be fundamentally changed: "Instauratio facienda ab imis fundamentis." And those ideals once changed, all motives for a war between England and Germany would vanish as by magic. But alas! ideas and ideals do not change by magic or prestige—they can only change by the slow operation of intellectual conversion. Arguments alone can do it.

Let us turn from the war lords of England and Germany to those who do not speak under the influence of military training or military occupation. We are told by the translator of Dr. Paul Rohrbach's book, *The German Idea in the World*, that it—

probably inspired more Germans than any other book published since 1871, for everybody felt that it presented a generally true picture of the Fatherland and indicated the paths which the Germans had resolved to follow.

This opinion I have had substantially confirmed by most competent authority. I think it gives us a real insight into the ideas that have moved the German people. You will note that the author does not hesitate to praise the Anglo-Saxon or to criticize the German, and that his underlying and dominating purpose is peaceful expansion.

The markets of the world! We need them to-day for our existence as positively as we need our own land, and the day is approaching with irrevocable certainty when we shall need them even more. We can be nationally healthy only so long as our share in the business of the world continues to grow, and only if this is the case shall we be able to foster the inner values which spring from our national idea, and let them take part with the other factors in the shaping of the culture of the world. * * *

The German idea, therefore, can only live and increase if its material foundations, viz. the number of Germans, the prosperity of Germany, and the number and size of our world interests continue to increase. As these foundations continue to grow they compel the Anglo-Saxons to make their decision between the following two propositions:

Will they reconcile themselves to seeing our interests in the world maintain themselves by the side of their own and come to an agreement with us concerning them? Or will they fight, with force of arms, to remain the sole mistress of the world? If they choose the latter, it will depend on our strength whether we conquer or surrender or hold our own. * * *

We have progressed within a generation with a rapidity which creates the belief that we can wipe out within a decade the losses of a century. But we grow dizzy when we contemplate our political economy shooting up to steep heights and resting only on the small support of European Germany, especially when we compare it with the much wider security across oceans and continents which England and America have built. It is here where the abyss is lurking into which our new grandeur may be hurled unless we secure it with stronger props than are made of iron or gold. We have now reached the point which illustrates a fact which no one can view too seriously, namely, that the world power of the Anglo-Saxons does not rest solely on external support, such as wealth, colonies, dominion over the seas and flourishing industries, but that corresponding to these material possessions a growth of character and of inner worth and an increase in the breadth of the Anglo-Saxon idea have actually justified the people possessing them in reaching out for the dominion of the world. * * *

The true attitude of England toward our navy and commerce is revealed by such comments as were contained in the famous article in the *Saturday Review* of September, 1897, which made a great stir in England and the whole world, and frankly stated that England's prosperity could only be saved if Germany were destroyed. "England," the article says in part, "with her long history of successful aggression, with her marvelous conviction that in pursuing her own interests she is spreading light among nations dwelling in darkness, and Germany, bone of the same bone, blood of the same blood, with a lesser will force, but perhaps with a keener intelligence, compete in every corner of the globe. In the Transvaal, at the Cape, in Central Africa, in India and the East, the islands of the Southern Sea, and in the far Northwest, wherever—and where has it not?—the flag has followed the Bible and trade has followed the flag there the German bagman is struggling with the English peddler. Is there a mine to exploit, a railway to build, a native to convert from breadfruit to tinned meat, from temperance to trade gin, the German and the Englishman are struggling to be first. A million petty disputes build up the greatest cause of war the world has ever seen. If Germany were extinguished to-morrow, the day after to-morrow there is not an Englishman in the world who would not be richer. Nations have fought for years over a city or a right of succession. Must they not fight for two hundred fifty million pounds of commerce?"

Doctor Rohrbach says:

We know very well that it does not reflect the feelings of the whole of England, but nevertheless of a considerable portion of the English Nation. * * *

The two political catch words, "reaction" and "government by feudal classes," which foreign public opinion frequently uses to describe German conditions, are not calculated to bring success to the German idea in the world. But they are not the only obstacles. Like other people, we suffer from the defects of our virtues. The reverse and unfortunate complement of that sense of duty and industry, which we call the positive poles of our character, are an offensive superiority and awkwardness of behavior, which are constantly putting us at a disadvantage. * * * Between these two observations there is so much German awkwardness, indolence, and ignorance of the national idea in its highest sense that we can explain the progress abroad which we have made only by the one thing in which we excel all other people: our exact and conscientious labor and our remarkable diligence.

The real evil lies in the doctrine of political and economic imperialism common to so many nations—the doctrine that holds that the economic welfare and progress of every nation and of its people depend upon securing constantly expanding markets and sources of supply, constantly expanding opportunities for trade, and that such opportunities are only to be found, or at least are best to be found, by acquiring political dominion over or spheres of influence in other countries, especially in countries relatively backward in industrial

development but capable of such development. If this is sound doctrine economically, if it really is enlightened selfishness, if it is not to be restrained by the sense of moral obligation to respect the rights of other nations, if, indeed, the whole theory is to be gilded and disguised by a supposed moral obligation to uplift the relatively backward peoples and develop the relatively undeveloped lands—the theory of the white man's burden—it would seem an irresistible conclusion that force must continue to rule the world and that peaceful civilization can go forward only under a dominant nation or under a balance of power between several dominant nations.

I do not believe that this doctrine will indefinitely continue to control politics and international relations. It is not morally sound. It is not economically sound. It is not even enlightened selfishness. It must and will disappear with the demonstration of its futility. This doctrine and civilization, as the masses of mankind are coming to conceive of civilization, are irreconcilably opposed. Force as a means of promoting economic interests or of advancing intellectual ideals is certain to diminish and to disappear, just as certainly as human slavery and the imposition of theological or religious dogma by force have already disappeared. The rapidity of the process will depend chiefly, if not entirely, upon the progress of education and intelligence among the mass of mankind. If, therefore, we desire to reduce the chance of war, either because it is right for the world that it shall be reduced, or because we are thinking only of ourselves and wish to escape its horrors, if our desire is to prepare for peace, the surest way to accomplish this result is, first, by seeing that our own national purposes and methods are not based upon the desire for economic expansion by means of political dominion or special privilege, or any sort of sphere of influence that discriminates in favor of our people as against those of any other nation; and secondly, by doing everything in our power to bring other nations to this same conclusion, including active cooperation with other nations to produce this result.

Our peace depends upon ourselves and upon the peace of the world; and one of the greatest steps toward the establishment of the world peace upon which our peace so largely depends is a sympathetic and effective cooperation between the Anglo-Saxon and the German and Scandinavian nations, to which Earl Grey has referred as “nearest to us in mind and sentiment.”

We are told that at the end of the war our potential enemies will certainly be exhausted and unable or disinclined to take up a quarrel with us. I wish I could have the assurance upon this score that some of my fellow pacifists entertain; but I can not forecast either our own wisdom or the degree of human emotion and human folly that will survive—that possibly may be born of—the greatest exhibition of human emotion and human folly that the world has ever seen. Our first duty, our most enlightened selfishness, is to do everything in our power now and at the close of hostilities to remove the causes of war, to create alternatives for war; but as we can not hope to remove every cause for war, as we can not be sure that effective alternatives for war will be devised or will be accepted, we have ourselves no sane alternative but to be prepared for effective defense. We have seen too clearly the realities of war to risk its coming or its consequences.

Our defense must be real or it will only add to our danger. Within the limits of what is strictly necessary for defense our preparation must be made as though it were certain to be needed. No fear that other nations will be led by our example to increase their armament unnecessarily can stand for one moment against the possibility of our need. What is incumbent upon us is to make it as clear as possible that the character and the extent of our military preparation are strictly defensive; indeed, our first inquiry should be into the possibilities of a military policy that will be on its face and in its essential characteristics defensive.

With the greatest deference, and subject to correction by demonstration and not by assertion, I venture to suggest that there is such a thing as a defensive military policy, which is essentially different in important particulars from an aggressive military policy, and that the plans for military and naval preparedness which are being presented to us either by the President and his political advisers, or by the General Board of the Navy, or the General Staff of the Army, do not recognize or apply the distinction.

I am not discussing these things as an expert, nor do I assume that my audience is composed of experts. I am, however, not without the support of expert opinion, although it has not been allowed much public expression. And I assume that the great audience of our ordinary fellow citizens, as inexpert but as intensely and vitally concerned as we are, will in the end settle our military policy on sea and land, for this is necessarily the way of democracy. Admiral Mahan says:

Justly appreciated, military affairs are one side of the politics of a nation and therefore concern the individual who has an interest in the government of the state. They form part of a closely related whole, and putting aside the purely professional details * * * military preparations should be determined chiefly by those broad political considerations which affect the relations of states one to another or of several parts of the same state to the common defense.

Robert Wilden Neeser, whose book, *Our Navy and the Next War*, is an argument for greater naval strength, nevertheless says:

In the last analysis it is the people who govern, it is the people who must be informed of their military condition. The regulations which forbid military and naval men writing for publication for the purpose of discussion should be rewritten. The freest discussion on all military and naval topics by officers of both services should be encouraged, such writings to be signed by the authors, for which they would assume the entire responsibility. When this privilege has been given, then the people will have a means of getting at the truth and the authority in each case will be known. By sealing the lips of those capable of giving the truth we have encouraged searchhead articles upon our naval preparedness which carry little weight and make no lasting impression upon the minds of the people.

Major-General Francis Vinton Greene has also called attention to the fact that Germany permits publication of frank discussions of military subjects—several thousand military books in a year as against several scores at the most in English-speaking countries.

At all events, whether they like it or not, the experts must convince us, untrained as we are. What we want and what we are entitled to have is candor and the fullest, freest opportunity for the expression of every sincere and intelligent judgment that has been or is being formed within our military and naval service. We are dealing with what is alleged to be and what we believe is matter of life and death.

On such a matter the order prohibiting officers in our military establishment from uttering and publishing opinions upon military policy¹ seems especially unwise and leaves the country altogether too dependent upon the officials or official boards that for the moment control the administration of our military and naval service. In that service are experienced and serious students of the problems of military and naval policy whose views upon fundamentals and upon important details disagree with the views of both the military and the political heads of our military and naval establishments. These differences of opinion are not being given to the public. We are thus being led to the unwarranted conclusion that there is unanimity among our experts as to the kind and extent of military preparation we should have.

I am a convinced advocate of securing and utilizing expert advice in the administration of public affairs. I have the highest regard and respect for the officers in our naval and military service. I attach the greatest importance to their opinions with respect to the things that will produce the most efficient military preparation for war and that will produce the greatest results in actual warfare. But what we are deciding is not the sort of an army or navy that will be most powerful in war, but what sort of an army or navy will be most effective for securing peace. And that is a question which involves issues of national policy that are not exclusively military—in which, indeed, the military motive is of secondary importance.

We must tell the Navy Board and the General Staff—not have them tell us—what it is we want an army and a navy to do; what are the purposes for which we wish to use an army and a navy. Then and then only can they tell us what kind of an army and navy will be best adapted for our purpose. Otherwise their opinions and estimates must necessarily be based on the assumption that we want a military establishment adequate to defend all our outstanding possessions and obligations, and to maintain all our supposed national policies and interests, and in the event of war, in the language of the recent report of the War College, “to insure a successful termination of the war in the shortest time.”

All this may sound somewhat captious and theoretical, of little practical value, but I am not without knowledge that there exists among military experts—and in our own military service—a recognition of the fact that there is a substantial difference between a defensive and an offensive military policy and that it is not being recognized in the plans which are officially recommended for our military preparation. We are being urged to support a military program which we are assured is intended only for defense; but it is not an exclusively defensive program. I do not intend to impugn in any degree the sincerity of its advocates—I think they believe that they are advocating a defensive policy; but they have not defined nor had defined for them what it is we wish to defend, nor have they abandoned that hoary maxim of military science that a strong offense is the best defense.

¹ “Officers of the Army will refrain, until further orders, from giving out for publication any interview, statement, discussion, or article on the military situation in the United States or abroad, as any expression of their views on this subject at present is prejudicial to the best interests of the service.”—War Department, General Order No. 10.

We shall make a serious mistake in all that we do toward military preparedness against war and for peace unless we tell our military experts, and tell them in a way that they will understand and accept, that we want a military establishment planned and prepared for defense and not for offense, even though offense may help defense—that we consciously and definitely intend to abandon and to have them abandon whatever military advantage there may be in having an army and a navy prepared to take the aggressive and to seek out and attack in force an enemy away from our own boundaries and waters. Only in this way can we convince the world that our object is pacific, that we are not merely repeating the hollow assurances of other nations that have built great navies and trained great armies in the name of peace only to use them for aggression when the opportunity and the temptation came. Only in this way can we be sure that we shall not yield to temptation when it comes. What is there in our national history to justify the claim that we will not use force to extend our boundaries or our dominion over the lands of weaker nations, no matter how sincerely at this time we intend not to do so? What right have we to thank God that we are not as other men, especially those Prussians? With an army and a navy designed for and substantially limited to the defense of our own lands and shores, we can with some confidence and effectiveness advocate those principles and agencies of international policy that are best adapted to reduce the chances of war.

To illustrate what I have in mind, and not I alone, but others whose military experience and training give greater weight to their opinions, let me ask you whether it is not clear that a real substantial clarification of the Monroe Doctrine, adopting and extending the suggestions of President Wilson's message, would not in itself do more to make war against this country unlikely than all the increase we are likely to make in our army and our navy? We hear much of possible war with Japan. Should we not do more toward the prevention of such a war by discussing with Japan the issues surrounding Japanese immigration and the Open Door in China man fashion and in a way and with results that would do justice to our interests and to Japanese interests and to that self-respect which Japan has earned her right to entertain? If we really intend to give national independence to the Philippines, should we not remove a great menace to our peace if we could secure international guaranties of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Filipino nation? If we should open the Panama Canal to the warships of all nations under international guaranties of the safety of the Canal itself and of our peaceful ownership and operation of it, should we not make it a prize less likely to excite the cupidity of other nations and less likely to lead to war with us? If we did these things, should we not need an army and a navy quite different in character and size from those we should need if we do not do them? Can we intelligently determine what sort of an army and a navy we need without considering what it is we propose to defend? If we retain all these possessions and interests and international policies, where can we stop in our military preparation? What folly to retain them if we do not propose to make serious and adequate preparation to defend them, and could not make really adequate preparation if we would.

It may be said that these matters really make no difference in the sort of military preparation we ought to make—that it will require the same sort of an army and the same sort of a navy to defend our own lands and waters that we should need to defend the Philippines and the Panama Canal and to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. No doubt some military authorities would make precisely this claim; but I venture to assert that excellent military authority is of quite a different opinion, and that it is supported by many considerations that appeal and should appeal to that great public which under our democratic government must and should decide the fundamental questions of policy directly involved.

We are at least entitled to ask questions. If our navy is intended only to defend our own shores from invasion, could we not enormously increase the number of our submarines for the same money that it is proposed to spend on dreadnaughts; and would not the result give us a far more effective navy for purely defensive purposes? Does not a single superdreadnaught cost as much as many submarines, depending on the types selected? If modern war—if this war—has taught us anything, it is that a navy of the dreadnaught class is of little if any practical value against a stronger navy of the same sort. The weaker navy is inevitably bottled up. It dare not come out into the open unless it is prepared to risk all upon the result of its unequal contest with a stronger force. Unless we are prepared to enter the endless competition in naval expenditure, is not the navy of the era that ended with this war a waste of money and a self-deception as an efficient instrument of defense? Is not this confessed by the insistence of those who cling to this type of navy that the United States must increase its navy until it equals the navy of any other nation? Some say any other nation except England, either because they are appalled at competition in naval expenditure with England, whose existence as a world power depends upon predominance at sea, or because they think we should assume that war will never occur between England and the United States. Some insist that we must have a navy equal in aggressive strength to the combined navies of any two other nations except England; and that anything less than this will leave us without adequate protection for the very reasons that are given as underlying the dreadnaught naval theory. Has not this war demonstrated that a navy composed chiefly of great numbers of submarines, supplemented by the torpedo boat, the destroyer, and the aeroplane, would be of immense defensive value against the most powerful dreadnaught navy afloat? Is not a single submarine an effective fighting unit against any fleet, while a single dreadnaught is of practically no value whatever? Might not a few submarines encounter and destroy a mighty fleet, while a dreadnaught navy outclassed in strength by an invading squadron would lie impotent in the harbor? Are we not about to commit this nation to a program of dreadnaughts that need yet more and more dreadnaughts to make them useful? Is it not wise to delay this program at least until we can know more than is now possible as to the place of the dreadnaught in the future navies of the world? Secretary Daniels says that expert opinion on this subject has undergone great fluctuations within the past few months. He has himself substantially increased the number of submarines for which the Navy Department is asking

over the number recommended by the Navy Board. Why not spend our dreadnaught money, at least for the present, on submarines and other defensive agencies? Even Neeser asks the question: "With the offensive submarine now a certainty, should we continue to build battleships?" And his answer is an evasion and is also based upon the premise that "the ultimate aim of war is to command the sea." Having already called the offensive submarine "a certainty," he says: "The new cruising submarine, if a success, may become a serious menace to a battleship fleet; but it does not seem a sufficient menace to stop the construction of those ships which have so long and in the face of all challengers held command of the sea."

But it may be said that such a navy as I am discussing could not be used so effectively as the dreadnaught in foreign waters away from its base. Precisely so: and is not this one of its chief advantages to us? Could we do anything that would so effectively stamp out military policy as intended only for defense as to create a navy that, while powerful for defense would by its very character have less power for aggression? If we wish only to defend ourselves, do we need any other navy? Can we do anything that will so completely convince the world that we mean what we say when we declare that we are arming only for peace? Can we do anything that will so increase our power to influence other nations to adopt the policies and the agencies that make for peace? Even if we had to concede that a defensive navy would lack some of the aggressive power that we might desire in actual warfare, can we not well afford to make this sacrifice for the immense gain in making war less likely to occur?

Is it not a choice between this policy and the race for naval supremacy which alone will enable us "to command the sea"? Norman Angell may be urging some propositions about which there may well be difference of opinion, but he has at least convincingly demonstrated one fallacy:

Mr. Churchill lays it down as an axiom that the way to be sure of peace is to be so much stronger than your enemy that he dare not attack you. One wonders if the Germans will take his advice. It amounts to this: Here are two likely to quarrel; how shall they keep the peace? Let each be stronger than the other, and all will be well. This "axiom" is, of course, a physical absurdity. On this basis there is no such thing as adequate defense for either. If one party to the dispute is safe, the other is not, and is entitled to try and make itself so.

Is there not a distinctively defensive policy applicable to the army just as to the navy? The arguments for increased land forces and reserves seem entirely sound. But this does not relieve us—even us laymen—from the necessity of considering what they should be and how they should be obtained. I do not propose to discuss details of military organization. It is important, however, for the public to understand that there are differences of opinion and of interest in the army as to what branches of the service should be increased. I am expressing no opinion, except that there should be complete freedom in the service for the public discussion of the issues.

All the military opinion about which I know anything is agreed that for a defensive policy we need trained officers, trained infantry, trained artillery, adequate equipment, and both an adequate supply of munitions and provision for increasing and maintaining an adequate supply of the things for which modern war makes such insatiate demands. Does the program of preparedness that has been pre-

pared for us contemplate these things? We are told that our preparation must be a genuine and a serious thing, that at the close of this war some victorious nation or combination of nations may decide to use its trained and veteran troops against us in resentment, or envy or lust of power or hope of loot, and that we must be ready and remain ready, that we must keep our powder dry. We are told that only thorough training and the very best equipment for an army in the leash would avail for our defense. And how is it proposed to secure such an army? Make a small increase in our regular troops and give a citizen soldiery annually a few months' intensive training that will not interfere too seriously with their business and professional occupations. Is there then no serious need for preparing against the possibility of a real invasion?

The truth is that at and for some time after the close of this war the United States may be in less danger from attack than at any time in its history. We all hope with differing degrees of confidence that out of the horrors and destruction of this war will come a real advance toward some form of international relations and international arrangements that will reduce the burdens of armament and the probabilities of war. If our hopes were really more than hopes, this nation might well await the outcome without increasing at this time its military establishment—not that we might not then take wise precautions to meet the actual situation that will then be disclosed, but that we could be so much wiser then than we possibly can be now. It is because our hopes are only hopes, and not certainties, that we are urged to prepare now against a possibility that might be so unspeakably disastrous to this country, to its men, and especially to its women and its children, that we are not justified in delaying at least adequate preparation to resist attack. But if we are really to prepare against a real attack, what folly it is to be less than adequately prepared. We should analyze the situation that is at all likely to confront us and meet that situation. What is the situation?

It seems clear that we need anticipate no attack from Great Britain or indeed from any of her allies for some time after this war, no matter what its outcome, unless we ourselves furnish some new and gratuitous occasion for a quarrel. For a hundred years we have settled amicably every issue with Great Britain, and many of the issues have been peculiarly irritating and important to both nations. Our substantive relations were never more sympathetically friendly, and new causes would have to arise to strain them. Our diplomatic relations were never so assured by treaties providing for the peaceful settlement of issues upon which we may disagree. Certainly this is true of Great Britain; and with her friendship and the already increased and growing appreciation of the reality and value of the Anglo-Saxon tie, a war between the two great Anglo-Saxon nations is practically unthinkable. I mention Great Britain because it seems not worth while to discuss the effect of our proximity to Canada in the event of war. Canada is probably a hostage in our reach against war with England; but let us assume that it would be a military asset for Great Britain. No other first-class power except England has any foothold in North America from which land forces could be drawn or in which they could be landed. Any other formidable enemy would be compelled to transport its

invading army across the ocean. I have had no opportunity to examine or to discuss with military officers in whose judgment I have confidence the recent report of the War College Division of the General Staff. We are all, however, entitled to question its soundness or its availability, as the President and the Secretary of War have questioned them. They are civilians like ourselves.

General Greene, however, has discussed at some length the problems presented to us in the event of such invasion and has advised us of the conclusions of such military students as Freiherr von Edelsheim in the service of the German General Staff. His conclusion is that our initial problem would be to prevent the landing, or to defeat after it landed, a force of 240,000 infantry with the ordinary normal complement of cavalry, artillery, stores, etc., and that this is the largest force that it would be practicable to transport to our shores as a single expedition. The War College now makes a larger estimate. Germany has permitted the public discussion of military problems of this sort. We have refused or restricted it. The weight of available military authority, however, seems agreed that we should have 500,000 trained soldiers to meet an invasion, and that this number of really trained men adequately equipped would successfully repel the invasion. It may be that, considering the disadvantages attending disembarkation, substantially less than this number would suffice for effective defense, provided they are trained soldiers, and not half-trained militia or national guardsmen. I speak in no terms of disrespect of our militia—quite the contrary. I merely insist upon the fact, recognized by the intelligent militia officers themselves, that men in active civil life who give all the time they can to military training can not successfully oppose regular troops. The militia can quickly become an army, but it can not be an army; and what we should need if an invasion threatened us would be an army. Then let us have an army—no larger than we need for the purpose of manning our defenses and repelling an invasion, but a real army of real soldiers adequate for this purpose and a militia adequate to fill the ranks as they need filling. I do not say 500,000 men; I say what number we need for the defensive purpose which we intend to accomplish.

The suggestion of universal military service in this country can be intelligently determined only by considering separately each of the objects for which it is alleged to be desirable. Its main—its real—purpose is military. If it is not necessary or at least desirable for strictly military purposes, it will never be adopted because of its alleged physical or disciplinary benefits. And for what conceivable purpose of military defense should we train to arms millions of the young men of the United States? From a military point of view this surely would be a senseless waste of time, energy, and money. If we are to have an army, let us have a real army, trained and efficient for its purpose. Let us have no superficial training of millions of schoolboys, no amateurish conscription of the adult manhood of the nation, creating a paper force immensely greater than any possible need for any purpose that we ought to entertain, only to demonstrate its inefficiency if a test of strength should come, to disseminate through the nation a false feeling of security, and to encourage the natural tendency toward brag and bluster to which Brother Jonathan has been unfortunately susceptible.

There is undoubtedly a strong feeling in the United States that, no matter what we should do in the way of military preparation, we should be in no danger of imperialistic ambition or that aggressive militarism which precisely the same policy has undoubtedly tended to create elsewhere. There is far greater danger from these sources than our people realize. This false assumption of a superior resisting power of Americans to the allurements of imperialism and national expansion only makes the danger more real. Human nature is essentially the same in Prussia and in the United States.

It is not in Germany alone that the Nietzschean exaltation of the Will to Power stirs the atavistic savage that lingers in most of us and in some of us to an exceptional degree. Few Americans may believe that war is a biological necessity, but many are easily persuaded that it is a necessity on other grounds, and its exhibition of primitive virtues and barbarian vigor distracts attention from its hideous cruelties and its senseless waste. We need to be constantly reminded that mankind is not degenerating because it is finding less use for some superb qualities of the animal and the savage, that evolution is out of the jungle, not back into it.

If German blood or German training makes men more prone to exalt force in international affairs, it will be well for us to remember that in 1910 there were in the United States 8,282,618 people who were born in Germany, or one or both of whose parents were born in that country. This takes no account of more than 2,000,000 of our population similarly derived from Austria.

If the United States is to have increased military forces—and it seems essential that we shall—let us not be blind to the dangers that are inseparable from military training and military strength. Let us endure with patience the taunts of the militant pacifist whose motto is "Speak softly and carry a big stick." I try sometimes to visualize that peace-loving and peace-seeking community in which that motto is carried into practical effect, as its distinguished author illustrates it in his own delightful way. Picture to yourselves the citizens of Chicago leaving their homes in the morning, each armed with a big stick, suited to his taste—one with beautifully polished knobs on the heavy end of the stick and one with nails carefully disposed upon its surface, to emphasize the value of the weapon as a deterrent of force and an incentive to peace—each swinging his little pacifier jauntily as he trudges sturdily or saunters leisurely along, speaking softly to those he passes about mollycoddles, cowards, and the Ananias Club. How certain it would be that no thought of violence would disturb the peaceful serenity of such a happy community. It is an excellent motto, but hard to live up to, and we shall do well not to underestimate the difficulty. Nations, like individuals, when they carry big sticks, seem predisposed to raise their voices.

It is said that the disbandment of our armies after the Civil War demonstrates that military training will not create a militaristic sentiment in the United States, but it is not from those who have had actual experience in war and have gone through the pit of hell, or at least looked into its mouth, that we need fear militaristic sentiment so much as from the man who has merely worn the trappings and studied the manual of arms. It is the little knowledge that is the dangerous thing.

Has consideration been given to the political dangers of an organized citizen soldiery containing millions of men, who would not regard the military work seriously because war would not really seem imminent?

The suggestion of a new sort of army—a continental army—is obviously due to the desire to meet the difficulty of putting the militia under direct Federal control, for it proposes nothing but a partially trained force of volunteers. Does it not seem far wiser to extend Federal support to the militia upon condition that the training shall comply with Federal requirements?

Has not Scharnhorst shown us our true military policy, when by transferring every man to the reserve as soon as he had been trained, the active army of 42,000 men, to which he was restricted by the Peace of Paris, became the army of 150,000 that contributed so powerfully to the defeat of Napoleon? Why should we not adopt the policy of training our soldiers as intensively as possible and then transfer them, as soon as they are trained, to a reserve receiving proper pay from the Government and subject to be called to the colors whenever needed? Would not such a plan give us a vastly superior army to that available in any other way? Would it be any less a citizen soldiery because it had one year's continuous training instead of three months' training for each of four years? Would not the interference with business or professional activity be far less and the cost to the country far less than under the plans proposed?

If some mechanical training accompanied the military training, it might extend the period of active service, but might it not equip the soldier for a more useful citizenship and make enlistment more attractive? The same thought applies to the education of the reserve of trained officers that should be provided.

Universal military service would undoubtedly distribute the military burden, but it would create the burden for the sake of distributing it. It is not "shirking" to oppose the imposition on our people of a burden which it is both unnecessary and unwise for them to assume. By making service in the army and in the militia of real value to those who enlist, as well as to the nation, we should create a military system that would justify itself, and that would secure forces amply sufficient for our defense. There should be no illusion as to the effect—if not the purpose—of doing more than this. Our sons, once trained, would be available for war beyond our borders, and even statutory declarations against using them there would not remove the consequences of their availability.¹

It may well be questioned whether the agitation for universal military training or any other form of conscription does not tend to discredit and to prevent a degree of actual military preparation which might otherwise receive popular support.

It is said that what we lack in the United States is discipline, and that military discipline will supply the need. We do want civic

¹ On January 4, 1916, the Associated Press sent out from Washington a dispatch for which it claimed exceptionally reliable information, stating that: "a navy equal in strength to those of any two world powers except Great Britain, and an army prepared to fight for the integrity of the Pan-American idea anywhere in Pan-America is the ultimate aim of the plans of the military experts."

On January 6, 1916, Secretary Garrison said before the Military Committee of the House of Representatives: "We have determined and announced that the sovereignty of the other republics of this hemisphere shall remain inviolable and must therefore at all times stand ready to make good our position in this connection."

discipline, the conscious and willing subordination of immediate individual freedom of action to concerted and cooperative control for the good of the community, a control in determining the extent and character and purpose of which the disciplined shall have a voice. Shall we get this from a training that consists chiefly if not wholly in obedience to orders? No military discipline in or out of the schools can be made much more than this for the great mass under the practical limitations that must prevail. Few, indeed, will be the individuals who will be trained to direct others, and these few will learn chiefly to direct the others in a routine essentially arbitrary and mechanical.

Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do and die,

is the ideal of military discipline, the quality we are called upon to praise and admire in the soldier. It is an admirable ideal for military purposes, but not so good for civic purposes, and what we are now discussing is the alleged civic advantage of military discipline upon the young manhood of the country.

As to the suggestion that military drill in the public schools would be justified on the ground of physical development, President Lowell, of Harvard, says that his experience on the Boston School Board convinced him that military drill in the public schools is a mistake; that the boys tired of drill, and were disinclined later to join the militia. He thinks other kinds of physical training are better, and that while his objection does not apply to colleges, drill should be a very small part of military training.

Former President Eliot says:

I feel strongly another objection to military drill in secondary schools, namely, that it gives no preparation whatever for the real work of a soldier. In the Boston High Schools military drill includes nothing but the manual of arms, company movements on even surfaces, and a few very simple battalion movements, mostly those of parade. The real work of a soldier is to dig in the ground with pick and shovel; to carry a burden of about fifty pounds on long marches; to run very short distances carrying a similar burden; and to shoot accurately with a rifle; throw hand grenades; and use rapidly and well machine guns and artillery. Military drill in schools has no tendency to prepare boys to do the real work of a soldier. The Swiss do not begin to train their young men for their army until they are about twenty years of age, except that they encourage voluntary rifle clubs for practice in shooting.

Assuming, however, that there would be both physical and disciplinary advantages in military training, it would not follow that we should obtain these advantages by compulsory military service.

It is said that military training would increase respect for law and order, and the proof of this is said to be the comparative statistics of crimes of violence in Switzerland and the United States. How about the comparative respect for law in England and in the United States, although England has not adopted universal military training?

If we were situated as is Switzerland, where any war or serious threat of war is certain to require the military service of every able-bodied citizen, and where, even then, every unit in the small population must have the very highest military efficiency practicable, we might justify universal military training, in and out of the schools. We may be sure that any attempt with us to train a citizen soldiery

under the Swiss system would almost certainly be perfunctory, because it would not be taken seriously. We must never forget that the discipline which Germany has given her citizens is a discipline which is not confined to their service in the army. The German people are trained to regard the state as the instrumentality through and by which they—each of them individually and all of them collectively—can best advance their interests—can best secure for themselves the necessities and the pleasures of life. Behind even the *verboten* is a larger consciousness of the advantages of communal action, a larger practical realization of those advantages, than obtains in any other great nation to-day.

Germany's industrial and social progress has been attained in spite of, and not because of, her system of enforced military training and service. Undoubtedly the conviction which has existed in Germany that war was a real and constantly impending probability has had an influence, perhaps a determining influence, in securing the adoption of certain policies, such as the government ownership and operation of railroads, and the development of waterways in connection with the railroads as a "coordinated" and interdependent transportation system. The same conviction of the imminence of war has perhaps had its influence in securing some of the social and industrial legislation which sound views of public policy justify and demand without the slightest regard to their military value. There is no evidence, however, that these social and industrial results in Germany were due to the military training of German citizens. Prussia is not the portion of the German Empire in which we find the most inspiring examples of peaceful progress. Again I find Paul Rohrbach instructive when he points out the antagonism of "the material provincialism of the small state and the old individualism of the German races, which in this case has been hardened and quickened by the long political separation." He says:

But we Germans of the Empire err if we think that this explanation settles the question. An equal share of the responsibility for the existing estrangement should be laid at the door of the North German element, which has gained hegemony in the new Empire, and which shows its inability to achieve in the world what one may call moral conquests. The shortsighted inflexibility of the North German, and most especially of the Prussian character, which can produce great things only among its own people, is easily explained by the course of its history. It deserves great, and perhaps even the sole, credit for the growth of Prussia to the state of a world power, and therefore, indirectly, for the union of the greater number of integral parts of the old Empire into the new Empire. Nevertheless, this special side of the Prussian character is developing more and more into an actual source of danger for our national future, especially in its modern unpleasant variations.

No; German social and industrial progress is not due to military training, but, as Paul Rohrbach says, to Germany industry, and to the fact that Germany has made more progress toward having her government perform the true functions of government in its internal and peaceful relations to its citizens than has been made by other governments, especially our own. Unless our preparation is not only planned for defense, and is, as far as practicable, unadapted for aggression, the preparation itself will add to the possibilities of war, because we shall be less afraid of the consequences of mistake and less on our guard against those who from ignorance or self-interest seek to persuade us to maintain unsound national ideals or purposes.

Other nations may, of course, make the same sort of mistake; may permit themselves to assert against us interests that are not their true interests or that they have no right to assert. We may have to defend ourselves against aggression born of their mistakes, but so far as actual war is concerned we are in far less danger from the selfishness or muddled thinking of other nations than we are from the selfishness or muddled thinking of our own people. We are defended, not only by our geographical separation from Europe and Asia, but by the character of our country itself, its extent and physical conformation, and, more than all this, by the conflicting interests of our possible enemies. The balance of power in Europe has always been more of a defense to us than even our isolation. The conquest of the United States has been impossible—the attempt unthinkable—except by land and naval forces too large to be spared from Europe. It was largely because of this condition that we succeeded in the war of the Revolution, and got off with a little humiliation in 1812. Only the creation in Europe as a result of this war of new conditions in which one or other of the contending parties is left so completely crushed as to destroy all fear from that nation in the mind of the victor or victors can possibly threaten us, and then the victor must have some motive, must see some advantage, in making war upon us.

No European nation can have any real motive to attack the United States except to prevent us from asserting claims or exercising rights in other countries which are not in accordance with its interests. There can be no motive of conquest, and it is equally unthinkable that any European nation would make war on us to impose discriminatory commercial or political conditions upon us, or merely to punish us or to loot us or force from us a money payment as the price of peace. Theoretically, any of these things might happen; practically they can be dismissed from serious consideration.

If the United States becomes involved in war it will be because it asserts some right or claims some privilege outside of its own territory, the assertion of which right or privilege runs counter to the interests of some foreign power, or it will be because some foreign power asserts a similar right or privilege against us. We can not of ourselves control the motives or the actions of other powers except by international agreement, backed by force or by measures short of force which may be equally effective for the purpose. Our first concern, however, is with our own attitude toward these matters. What are the rights or privileges we claim or wish to claim outside of our own territory? Are we claiming or are we likely to claim any rights or privileges that are likely to be challenged by other nations? What are the foundations for such claims? Are they sound in principle and in law? How important to us is their assertion if challenged? Are they important enough to fight for? Are there other remedies than war available to us if they are challenged? What are they? Is our claim similar in character to that of other nations, and should we take steps to unite all nations who are interested in the same essential claims for its defense against a possible aggressor? Should we unite North and South America in the defense of our common interests, and if this seems desirable, why should we draw an artificial line excluding agreements with European nations in matters where our common interests are as clear as, or clearer than, our Pan American interests?

To reach right answers to these questions we must above all clear our minds of the false doctrine that enduring economic interests can be promoted by force. Undoubtedly temporary advantages can be secured by the exploitation of other nations, especially—perhaps exclusively—undeveloped peoples and undeveloped lands; but in the long run the commercial interests of the world are mutual. Our prosperity is dependent upon prosperity elsewhere. Every nation obtains materials or goods from others and sells to others its own surplus of materials or goods. Every nation has most to gain by helping to advance the trade of the world; to make all nations prosperous while fostering its own commerce by every means consistent with sound economic laws. So far as the happiness of the mass of mankind or of the masses of any particular nation is concerned the adjustment of world commerce to the natural laws of commerce wholly overbalances the temporary advantages of exploitation. Otherwise it would be to the economic interest of this nation to encourage the continuation of the war in Europe so that we might continue our artificial trade in munitions. We owe much to Norman Angell for his convincing presentation in effective popular form of the economic fallacy that world commerce follows national lines and that imperialism is commercially profitable.

The imperialistic theory is built upon the history of the British Empire and upon a misunderstanding of that history, especially upon a failure to comprehend that economic conditions are now so radically and irrevocably different that the British Empire itself is commercially and politically revolutionized. The history of England can not be repeated any more than can the history of Rome, and wise men would not desire to repeat either if they could. We can not ignore the process by which the world has been convinced that the welfare of the mass of the people is the real test of national success. Privilege may gain from exploitation, but not democracy; and democracy has come to stay as the economic, social, and intellectual ideal of civilization even more than as a political ideal. This will be clearer to mankind after this war, and we may suspect that it is becoming clearer and clearer during the war. Right now in the trenches no power can keep the soldier from thinking and thinking about the state and his relation to it. Even if he is led to magnify the value of organization and efficiency, he intends to ask for organization and efficiency in *his* interest and not in the interests of privilege or class.

The very first thing that we Americans should consider to-day is the relation which we wish our Government to assume toward us as individuals and toward other nations. Our whole attitude toward this war and its results depends upon our conception of the function of the state. What are our ideals of the individual life and of community life? Do we conceive that the most desirable life for ourselves—for individual men—is the life in which there is the least possible restraint upon individual freedom of action, not only the action of each man in those things that concern him alone—if, indeed, there are any such things—but also in those things that affect others, leaving the result of the conflict between individuals to be decided by the relative strength or cunning of the individual? There are those who, consciously or otherwise, really desire a world in which the strong, the astute, the intellectually and physically su-

perior are to have the fullest freedom to enjoy every advantage which they can obtain over their inferiors. If they are shrewder, if more farseeing, if they are stronger, more vigorous physically and intellectually, they contend that it is their right to anticipate those who are less alert, less farseeing, less cunning, in seizing the things or the positions that are available, and that, having seized them, it is their vested right to hold them, even when it becomes clear that these things and these points of vantage are essential to the community as a whole and to the general mass of mankind. Men who hold this view regard it as a merit, as a demonstration of worth, that they foresaw what some day the community would need, some natural resource, some particular piece of property, the potential value of which was not generally appreciated at the time, and that they acquired it so that in the day of need they could profit from the needs of their fellows. We shall have to get rid of this idea in our individual and national life if we are to get rid of the most prolific source of war in the field of international relations.

Let us not confuse creative industry with mere shrewdness or foresight or superior mental or physical capacity. Superiority of this kind should have no reward for itself, but only for its exercise for the benefit of others, for the community as a whole. When it confines itself to forecasting the future and seizing now those things that are to be valuable hereafter it has no real claim to the gratitude or the respect of others. It has added nothing to the wealth or the welfare of mankind. It may be difficult to draw the line, but it is none the less certain that there is a line of distinction between creative and predatory wealth; and the duty of the community is to draw the line as rapidly as it can discern where it really lies and to approximate it even when its exact location is not entirely clear. It is the business of the community to protect community interests and to promote community welfare. If there is anything clear in our philosophy or our history it is that civilization is developing in this direction:

With thousand shocks that come and go,
With agonies, with energies,
With overthrowings, and with cries,
And undulations to and fro.

We know now that success in war depends, after the first shock, on social and industrial solidarity far more than upon the number of trained soldiers that can be placed in the field. It is easier to enlist men and to train them if the front can be held for a time—in our case if the first invading expedition can be held off or seriously crippled—than it is to organize the national economic and industrial forces to support the troops if they are to be successful under the conditions of modern warfare. In his annual message of December 7 President Wilson emphasized our duty in this regard:

While we speak of the preparation of the Nation to make sure of her security and her effective power we must not fall into the patent error of supposing that her real strength comes from armaments and mere safeguards of written law. It comes, of course, from her people, their energy, their success in their undertakings, their free opportunity to use the natural resources of our great homeland and of the lands outside our continental borders which look to us for protection, for encouragement, and for assistance in their development, from the organization and freedom and vitality of our economic life.

The domestic questions which engaged the attention of the last Congress are more vital to the Nation in this its time of test than at any other time. We can

not adequately make ready for any trial of our strength unless we wisely and promptly direct the force of our laws into these all-important fields of domestic action.

He then proceeds to select one pressing economic problem to which to direct particular attention. He says:

In the meantime may I make this suggestion? The transportation problem is an exceedingly serious and pressing one in this country. There has from time to time of late been reason to fear that our railroads would not much longer be able to cope with it successfully as at present equipped and coordinated. I suggest that it would be wise to provide for a commission of inquiry to ascertain by a thorough canvass of the whole question whether our laws as at present framed and administered are as serviceable as they might be in the solution of the problem. It is obviously a problem that lies at the very foundation of our efficiency as a people. Such an inquiry ought to draw out every circumstance and opinion worth considering, and we need to know all sides of the matter if we mean to do anything in the field of Federal legislation.

The issue thus raised will be found to go far deeper than mere changes in "the process of regulation." No lesson of the war has been more clearly taught than that efficient transportation is of the very essence of military efficiency and strength. It is equally true, as President Wilson says, that the transportation problem in peace "lies at the very foundation of our efficiency as a people." Our present method of dealing with it is increasingly unsatisfactory to the private interests involved, and it is not satisfactory to the public. We have secured many improvements by adopting public regulation, but as this regulation proceeds it becomes more and more apparent that the transportation system of the country is essentially one interrelated and interdependent whole. There may always be a rivalry in economy and efficiency of service, but competition for traffic is moderated by a division of territory, or a gentlemen's agreement, while competition in rates has almost disappeared.

Governmental regulation has served to bring out clearly the essentially monopolistic character of our railroad system as a whole and the necessity of that "coordination" to which President Wilson refers. The question is whether coordination in the public service can be obtained so long as our railroads do not have a common financial interest as among themselves, but only a common financial interest as against the public. Can a public service which is essentially monopolistic be satisfactorily performed as a competitive enterprise? Are we not losing the benefits of competition without obtaining the advantages of regulated monopoly? We are certainly irritating and discouraging private enterprise based on competitive profits. So unsatisfactorily is the result that some of our leading railroad officials regard public ownership as the only escape from what they consider destructive regulation. The question is whether "coordination" can be obtained without public ownership.

Germany has owned and operated her railroads, from the point of view of public service, in peace and in war, not from the point of view of profits, although the profits have been large. The probabilities seem to be that after the close of this war every railroad in Europe will be nationalized. Military reasons may be the determining factors in this result, but it may well be questioned whether any satisfactory solution of the transportation problem can be reached in any other way. Whether our government should take over our railroads and when and upon what conditions may raise many questions of expediency, but if we are to treat the issue with open mind

it is important that we should understand that if, in the public interest, the government should do so, it will not be invading the domain of private enterprise, but will merely be taking back to itself a function of government which, for what seemed sufficient reasons of expediency, it had previously delegated to private agencies.

I take it we shall all agree that if there is something which it is the true function of government to perform, that thing will never be performed as it should be until the government performs it. We may disagree about what is the true function of government, but once it is determined that on principle the performance of a particular service is a function of government, that means, if it means anything, that under right conditions of government it will be better performed by the government than if left to private enterprise. If a government is not performing all of the functions of government it is to that extent a failure as a government. The results must continue to be less satisfactory and less efficient than they should be and can be if the government is performing all of its functions, is qualified to perform them, and is performing them properly. Now, nothing is more clearly settled in the law of this country and in the principles upon which that law is based than that railroads as common carriers are performing a function of government. The Supreme Court of the United States and many other courts have so held. (See *United States v. Joint Tariff Association*, 171 U. S., 505, 570; *Talcott v. Pine Grove*, 23 Federal Cases, 652, etc.) Indeed, the construction and control of the public highway is historically and on principle one of the first of the functions of government, and a railroad is a public highway. My purpose in discussing this matter has been to indicate how deep the issues of industrial mobilization go. In England it already involves the relations of the trade unions to the government.

It is insisted by some that the abolition of war or even its substantial diminution is an idle dream; that we may be reasonably certain that for one reason or another this country will be involved in war within a comparatively short time. Very well. It is now clear that industrial mobilization is as essential to modern war as is military mobilization, and such mobilization can not be effectively made after hostilities occur unless the government already has the powers and is exercising the activities essential to effective mobilization. It is even more difficult to agree upon the principles and to create the machinery for industrial mobilization than for military mobilization, and lack of actual experience in applying the principles and operating the machinery may be disastrous in the one case as in the other. Do the prophets of war propose to face now the problems of economic and industrial mobilization? If they do it will be necessary to abandon some dogmatic assumptions which have heretofore formed and still form so large a part of our political thinking.

One of the most significant things in the development of all modern thought has been the decline in the acceptance of dogma. Outside of the exact sciences, like mathematics, we have learned to look with suspicion and distrust on dogmatic statement of laws or principles. William G. Sumner says: "If you want war, nourish a doctrine. Doctrines are the most frightful tyrants to which men ever are subject, because doctrines get inside of a man's own reason and betray him against himself." Consciously and unconsciously, the

pragmatic philosophy is succeeding the dogmatic in science as it is in theology. Experiment is succeeding assumption as the sure foundation of human progress. In no field is this so important as in the field of political and social science—of nothing is it so true as of government. In the United States we have been particularly in danger of dogmatic error because of the wide acceptance of the proposition that that government is best which governs least, a dogmatic principle as vicious and unsound as the opposite dogma upon which socialism is based; for the dogma that the state should directly cover the whole field of human industry is equally fallacious. The truth, as usual, lies between. Government is not best when it governs least, nor is it best when it governs most. Government is best when it is doing well whatever will promote the welfare of the community most if done by the community than if left to be done by part of the community. And yet, progress is unquestionably in the direction of the extension of governmental activities into fields heretofore left to private enterprise, and we must be open minded toward further movement in that direction. Germany is strong to-day in war, not only because she is prepared for war, but because she has gone further than other nations in the assumption by her government of those social and industrial responsibilities which government should assume whenever it is apparent that, by so doing, the welfare of the nation—the greatest good to the greatest number—will be promoted. She has not accepted socialism, but she has been hampered by no dogma that the state must govern as little as possible. To the extent to which she has accepted and acted upon the principle that it is the true function of government to do whatever will promote the interest of the community better if undertaken by the community than if left to private enterprise, just to that extent has she strengthened herself and secured the grateful loyalty of her people. So we, too, must proceed, if we would prepare for the constructive uses of peace that grateful recognition of the value of the nation to its people, and that patriotic support of the people for the nation, which we are being exhorted to prepare for the destructive purposes of war.

In the long retrospect we shall find nothing clearer than that the evolution of government is steadily toward the assumption of new functions in the service of the people. Slowly but surely the movement has steadily gone forward in this direction, and always over the protests of those who have insisted that each advance was an unwarranted invasion of the field of private enterprise, of the rights and liberties of the individual.

Even the collection of taxes for the support of the state was once farmed out to those who found in it an opportunity for private profit. The practice found its justification in the claim that an army of tax collectors would be a public menace, and that the government could not possibly collect the taxes as economically and efficiently as private individuals. To-day it would be a rare individual indeed who would conceive that it is not the function of the state directly to collect the taxes necessary for its own support.

Time will not permit even the enumeration of other functions once supposed to be peculiarly private in their character, but which are now exercised by the government almost as a matter of course. It is

almost axiomatic that the government shall conduct the Post Office, shall supply water, and shall extinguish fires. All of these things were once regarded as peculiarly sacred to private enterprise. I once represented a client who owned and operated as a private profit-making enterprise the sewer system of a thriving middle western town which was prevented by financial limitations in its charter from performing this primary municipal function. In reading Ferrero I was amused and instructed by his account of the sources of the wealth and political power of Crassus in 69 B. C. Ferrero says:

Since the houses at Rome were mostly built of wood, and the *Ædiles* had so far failed to organize efficient measures of prevention, fires were at this time exceedingly frequent. This suggested to him a very ingenious idea. He organized a regular fire brigade from amongst his slaves, and established watch stations in every part of Rome. As soon as a fire broke out the watch ran to give notice to the brigade. The firemen turned out, but accompanied by a representative of Crassus, who bought up, practically for nothing, the house which was on fire, and sometimes all the neighboring houses which happened to be threatened as well. The bargain once concluded, he had the fire put out and the house rebuilt. In this way he secured possession of a large number of houses at a trifling cost, and became one of the largest landlords at Rome, both in houses and land, which he was then able, of course, to exchange, to sell, and to buy up again almost as he chose. Having become in this way one of the richest, if not the richest man in Rome, his power steadily increasing with every rise in the price of money, Crassus soon became a dominating figure in the Senate and the electorate, and indeed among all classes of the community.

Indeed, when later, an *ædile* who sprang from the common people extended the function of government in Rome to include the operation of a fire brigade, his activities were very much resented, and the privileged classes found it difficult to explain and impossible to justify his popularity with the people. I have no doubt that Rome rang with the same arguments about the invasion of the field of private enterprise with which the public ownership of railroads and other public utilities is received in this country to-day.

I am far from suggesting that in any given community, at any given time, it would be axiomatic, or even expedient, for the government to undertake all or any of these enterprises. I am merely asserting that it is by no means true that it should not do so solely because it would conflict with some dogmatic conception of the state. It is a question of wise expediency under existing conditions in every case, remembering always that the inexorable law of social evolution is moving steadily toward the assumption of community functions by the community.

The argument that the government has been too weak, too inefficient, or too corrupt to be trusted with functions which might be performed by a better government is only a confession of the indictment against our government and us. It is quite true that, in determining the ultimate interests of the community we must look for the long result. We must not destroy the incentives that are essential to progress. The whole fabric of existing civilization is based upon the institution of private property, upon the conception that in the existing stage of human development the best and most effective way in which to advance the well-being of mankind is by an appeal to the self-interest or the necessities of individuals; but even if we are entirely sure that necessity and financial gain are the most effective incentives to industry for the mass of mankind, are we not

all coming to see that there is a point at which we overload the lure? Once we rise above the pinch of poverty and attain physical comfort and intellectual opportunity, are there not other incentives besides money that will stimulate and attract the very highest talent and the very greatest industry? Is not this demonstrated by the financial sacrifices made by so many of the very best men in our public service? You know what the desires, the hopes, the aspirations that animate you. What is it that you think would prove most satisfying and would call out the best there is in you? Is it not the conscious and effective use of your faculties for the accomplishment of things which you think are worth while? Is not the basis of real happiness obscured by false standards of success? There are dangers in democracy, just as there are dangers in privilege, but mankind has definitely discarded the old ideal of aristocracy. The purpose of civilization is not to produce an efflorescence, but to elevate the mass. The aristocracy of the future is to be an aristocracy of service, not of privilege: of achievement, not of acquisition.

The very first and most essential of all our preparation must be to make our government—local, state, and national—what it should be. This is the service for which we need universal training and a patriotism that is nobler and more useful than all the patriotism of war.

It is suggested that we already respond to the civic appeal more easily than to the appeal for military sacrifice, but Hiram Maxim says.

I wonder why it is that we are not as enthusiastic in this social service work as we are in attacking the problem of war. Is it that there is more glory and more that appeals to the martial imagination in attacking war and warriors than there is in the prosaic, tame, and glamorless enterprise of simply saving human life in peaceful pursuits for the mere sake of saving it?

Senator Root has recently made an eloquent appeal for military preparation, in which he said:

Do not let us deceive ourselves. Adequate preparation for the preservation of our liberty means a vast expenditure, but it means more than that; it means a willingness for self-sacrifice, a spirit among our people, the length and breadth of the land, among the rich and the poor, among the highly educated and the graduates of the common school, among professional men, merchants and bankers, farmers and laborers—a national spirit among the people of the land, and a determination to preserve the liberty and justice of the American Republic and to make a sacrifice of means and convenience, comfort, and, if need be, of life, in the cause.

To every word of this we should subscribe. But I wish the Senator had gone on to demonstrate—as he could do so well—that the patriotism and self-sacrifices of peace are of more transcendent importance, even as a preparation for war, than any present resolution of willingness to sacrifice “means and convenience, comfort, and, if need be, of life,” upon the field of battle. I am not detracting in the least from the importance of making defensive military preparations; but a determination to preserve the liberty and justice of the American Republic, and to make some sacrifice of means and convenience and comfort in the piping times of peace will be our best preparation for war and our most likely insurance against it.

Do not let us deceive ourselves. The United States of America, as a nation, is worth preserving, is entitled to our loyalty and devotion, only to the extent that it is an agency to promote the moral,

intellectual, and physical well-being of its people, not some of its people, but all of its people—only to the extent that, in very truth, in the realities of the everyday life of the men, the women, and the children who inhabit it, its conscious ideal is the greatest good to the greatest number. To carry out that ideal means a vast expenditure, willingly and intelligently made; it means a preparedness for self-sacrifice in times of peace quite as much as in times of war—nay, a greater self-sacrifice, because the progress of civilization is measured by the extent to which peace supersedes and supplants war. It means a spirit among our people the length and breadth of the land, among the rich and the poor, among the highly educated and the graduates of the common school and those to whom fortune unhappily has given no schooling at all, among professional men, merchants and bankers, farmers and laborers—a national spirit determined to make the American Republic an agency of liberty and justice at home and abroad.

In the service of this ideal, let us destroy every special privilege and be prepared to sacrifice means and convenience and comfort and, if need be, life itself to protect that government and the people it governs against every assault by force or cunning, whether from within or from without. Let us make social justice and social service our national ideal; and to this end let us control and develop our national resources in times of peace, not only that they may be mobilized in time of war, but because a government which is performing this sort of service to its people will be thus most effectively organized for peace. By all means, let us have an army and a navy adequate for the defense of such a nation, but let us realize that far more important than armies and navies are our national purposes and policies.

Are we really without the desire and the hope that the United States may acquire exceptional advantages in the commercial development of other countries—let us say, in this hemisphere or parts of it, in Cuba and the West Indies, in Mexico and Central America? Are we entirely free from the subconscious thought that here is our sphere of influence? How far is this thought at the bottom of the modern development of the Monroe Doctrine, especially as conceived by Secretary Olney when he declared that “the United States is practically sovereign on this continent”? Is it because of its hoped-for economic advantages to us that we insist upon a doctrine which seems no longer to have any political justification? Certainly we are no longer in apprehension that our republican form of government would seriously be jeopardized if any European nation should acquire political dominion over, or should plant its colonies in, South America. Those countries repudiate and resent our assumption of a benevolent protectorate over their national interests. They look with suspicion upon all our declarations of disinterestedness and point to our dealings with Mexico in the acquisition of Texas and California and to other incidents in our history as proof of the justice of their fears. Even the declaration of President Wilson, that this country will never again seek to acquire a foot of territory by force of arms, is regarded merely as the expression of a personal opinion, or as in the same class with the diplomatic assurance of pacific intention which has usually preceded the extension of the British or the French or the German or the Italian domains.

There is a clearer mutual understanding and a closer community of political and commercial interest between the principal countries of South America and the great nations of Europe than between those countries and ourselves. The ties of race and language and religion are closer. Few of our people understand how the eastward trend of the southern portion of this hemisphere brings South America into as close or closer proximity to Europe than to the United States, especially when available trade routes are taken into consideration. South American development has been financed in Europe, not in the United States, and to attempt to expand our commerce in that direction without assuming the large financial obligations that are essential to it is merely to work against the natural laws of trade.

Pan Americanism exalts physical geography, which is important; but commercial, intellectual, and racial geography is more important. Pan Americanism must be based on and be measured by real mutuality of interest and obligation. We should recognize and strengthen our mutual interests with Latin America, but we should not forget other equally or more important interests in Canada or Europe. The preservation of existing political geography to the south of us against change by violence should tend to increase stability where this is especially desirable; but why should we insist that the Americas are a separate international unit over which the United States is to maintain a benevolent protectorate at its own risk and without control over their domestic conditions or foreign policies?

To assert that the Monroe Doctrine is essential to our national safety has become an absurdity. Monarchical institutions no longer threaten our Republic. We have lived to see a republican form of government firmly established in France and to see constitutional monarchy develop steadily toward the essentials of representative democracy. We have lived for more than a century in immediate contact with a great self-governing colony of England, with the result that we have influenced its institutions far more than it has influenced ours. The whole purpose of President Monroe's famous declaration and the whole justification for making it have undergone a transformation so complete that nothing but the lack of intelligent discussion of the question can explain the extent to which it is regarded as something as holy as the Ark of the Covenant by so many of the American people.

It is safe to say that we believe in something called the Monroe Doctrine because we do not understand it and are making no attempt whatever to define it or to appraise its value to us. Let us not confuse it with that doctrine which is practically recognized by all the great nations of the world, viz., that wherever a nation is in fact so situated that the acquisition or control of immediately adjacent countries by great and powerful rivals would jeopardize its peace and security, that nation, in the exercise of its right of self-defense, can justly insist upon its rival refraining from such an extension of its domain. The point is well illustrated by the declaration of Paul Rohrbach with reference to the possible absorption of Holland by Germany. He says: "The resulting disturbance of the political equilibrium in Europe would be so distinctly in favor of Germany that all the other States would be justified in rising in protest against it." The right of a nation to protect its vital interests has been uni-

versally recognized, subject always to the possible exercise of superior force to override the objection. No nation has questioned the right of another nation to assert its vital interests, although it may have questioned its power to maintain them. The issue is an issue of fact. Does the particular thing which is threatened jeopardize the vital interests of the protesting nation?

The Monroe Doctrine has never been accepted by other nations as sound in principle, although the acquiescence of Great Britain has prevented it from being challenged; but if we were frankly to assert that the acquisition of Mexico by a European nation would be regarded as an unfriendly act because it threatened the vital interests of the United States it is exceedingly unlikely that there would be any attempt to deny that we were justified in interfering. Whether we should assert such an interest in the future of Mexico would depend upon the question of fact as to its influence upon our national security. Whether our interest would be admitted would depend upon the question of fact as to the effect of the proposed action upon the vital interests of this nation. It might depend upon our military ability to sustain our position; but what I am trying to make clear is that the validity of the Monroe Doctrine depends upon principles of universal international application and not upon principles peculiar to us or to the American continents.

In the interests of national security we should ourselves confine the Monroe Doctrine to these limits. In its present vague form it is a menace to our peace and to the peace of the world—all the more dangerous because we have not now, and we do not propose to have, military force sufficient to maintain it if it should be seriously questioned. Nothing is so dangerous to peace as the assertion of a right which is offensive to others, which they believe to be unjustified, and which we are not, and do not expect to be, prepared to defend. It is in support of the broader Monroe Doctrine and incidentally to get the support of the Pacific Coast that the Navy League is insisting that we should have a navy on the Pacific stronger than Japan's and another navy on the Atlantic stronger than the navy of any other nation except England—a policy which, fortunately, there seems to be no probability whatever of the United States being persuaded to adopt. And yet, if we do not have such a navy, I must agree with Homer Lea when he says that "the Monroe Doctrine, if not supported by naval and military power sufficient to enforce its observance by all nations singly and in coalition, becomes a factor more provocative of war than any other national policy ever attempted in modern or ancient times."

Our greatest duty, therefore, is not to build fleets to maintain the Monroe Doctrine, but it is to consider whether the Monroe Doctrine, in any other sense than the protection of our vital national interests, is worth the risk of war and the cost of preparing for it. If it can not be justified upon the ground of defense, can it be justified upon the ground of self-interest? The Monroe Doctrine may have helped drive Maximilian out of Mexico. It may have served us in some indeterminate directions during the first half of our national existence, but if it has profited us in any other way the evidence does not seem to be available. Certainly we can show no financial profit and no prospect in this direction.

It may not be clear that our trade in Latin America would have been substantially greater if it had been colonized by European nations and developed under their flags, but it certainly is not clear that this would not have been the case. Our total trade with South America for the year ending June 30, 1913 (unaffected by war), was a little over \$360,000,000. Our trade with Canada the same year was over \$535,000,000. Approximately \$162,000,000 of our South American trade was with Brazil alone, the greater portion being imports of coffee, which we may safely assume would have sought a market in this country no matter under what flag the coffee had been raised. It seems equally true that our sales of agricultural implements to South America would doubtless have been as great if the flag of England or Germany or France or Italy or Spain had been flying in the southern portion of the hemisphere.

I am not regretting the political independence of the South American republics. On the contrary, I share in the feeling of pride in their achievements, which is perhaps not justified by our contribution to that result. I am merely pointing out that the further assertion of the Monroe Doctrine would seem to have no justification in the commercial results obtained by it; and the extension of our trade in the future will depend upon considerations with which the Monroe Doctrine has nothing whatever to do. But even if it were true that its abandonment would result in some diminution of our commerce, which I do not believe, the loss would be utterly insignificant in comparison with the expenditure we shall have to make if the Monroe Doctrine is to be anything but a source of weakness and of danger.

There is a widespread popular impression that Germany has ulterior designs on South America, and that, if successful in the present war, she will restrict the trade of other nations and discriminate against this country. I find no justification for this opinion. I have no doubt that Germany resents and disagrees with the doctrine of Monroe. I have no doubt that, whether successful or unsuccessful in the war, she will seek to push her trade and commerce in South America. But all of the indications are that Germany has been looking to the Near and Middle East as the field peculiarly adapted for her political and commercial expansion. It is the Bagdad Railroad and the ancient Babylonian empire upon which she seems to have fixed her desires, and with respect to which she so bitterly resents the restrictions for which she holds England responsible. There is much misunderstanding about German colonization in South America. It is estimated that the total German immigration now in Argentina, for instance, is only 30,000, while there are 950,000 Italians and 150,000 French.¹ I have been unable to obtain the total figures for Brazil, but in 1910 the immigration was 30,857 Portuguese, 20,813 Spanish, 14,163 Italians, 3,902 Germans, etc.

I shall refer to only one other matter of this character, and that is our relations with Japan; and I select them because we are supposed by many to be in greater danger of a collision with Japan than with any other nation, unless it be Germany. It is said that Japan is likely to attack us, because we offer an enticing opportunity for loot, because

¹ The official immigration figures in Argentina for the period from 1857 to 1908 are as follows:

Italian, 1,799,423; Spanish, 795,243; French, 188,316; English, 42,765; Austro-Hungarian, 59,800; German, 40,655; Swiss, 28,344; Belgian, 20,668; other, 203,242. The emigration was a little less than half the immigration.

Japan wishes to acquire the Philippines, and because she wishes to force us to accept her people as immigrants and to treat them on a parity with the immigrants from other countries.

I think we may dismiss, as unworthy of our own intelligence, the suggestion that Japan would make a wanton attack upon this country merely in the hope of exacting an indemnity or of pilaging our Pacific coast. Japan has done nothing that would justify the assumption that she would be influenced by such a motive, even if she could be persuaded that she would succeed. No nation in the history of the world has so clearly earned the right to have its motives, its intelligence, and its achievements treated with respect than has Japan. Her ambition is clearly to secure the respect of the civilized world and to deserve it. In my judgment she will be more punctilious in respect to international morals than many nations that boast a broader civilization. But if nothing else would restrain her she is too intelligent not to know that all she could secure in the way of pecuniary advantage would have to be returned manyfold in the competition of armaments that would inevitably ensue, until this country had made her atone for every wrong that she had done to us. The day of the international marauder on any such scale as this is over.

The Open Door in China is one of the issues which are thought to be provocative of trouble with Japan. Hiram Maxim says a Japanese diplomat asked him by what logic we can proclaim America for the Americans and disclaim Japan's right equally to proclaim Asia for the Asiatics. What is the answer? Baron Shibusawa recently said in my hearing that Japan was especially desirous of cordial relations with the United States for three reasons: First, because Japan recognized many obligations of gratitude to the United States for our conspicuous part in the acceptance and development of modern conditions and institutions by Japan; secondly, because one-fourth of Japan's foreign commerce was with the United States, and Japan was anxious to retain and increase it; thirdly, because the greatest world problem was the adjustment and mutual understanding of oriental and occidental civilization, and that Japan believed the two nations best adapted to bring this about were Japan and the United States working sympathetically together for this purpose. Such speeches may be only international compliments, but they deserve thoughtful consideration.

As to the Philippines, there is no evidence that Japan desires them at this time, when her hands are full to overflowing with opportunities in Korea and China. And what is our policy in the Philippines? Do we really intend to establish there an independent nation? Do we propose to retain control over its international policies after we have given it independence? If we do not control, do we none the less propose to protect the Philippine nation against the consequences of its own policies or to guarantee its sovereignty or territorial integrity? If we seek to retain no special advantages over other nations in the commercial development of the Philippine Islands and are animated by sincerely benevolent motives, should we not seek to secure international guaranties that would be far more effective than anything that we alone can do to assure independence of the nation

for whose existence we are to be responsible? Is it at all clear that Japan would not gladly join in such an arrangement?

The remaining source of future trouble with Japan is the policy which we adopt toward her with respect to immigration and the rights of her people while residing in this country. There can be no question that Japan resents the manner in which her people are being treated on the Pacific coast. Whether California is justified or not in the substance of what she seeks by restricting the rights of the Japanese to acquire and hold land is entirely outside the point. The citizens of the United States are under restriction with respect to land ownership in Japan, and this subject is susceptible of diplomatic adjustment on a basis that will recognize the mutual self-respect of both countries. Japan has given evidence of the most substantial character of her desire to meet and treat this issue in a broad-minded and practical way. She asks merely that it shall be so treated. If we treat her thus, and have California treat her thus, we shall do more to reduce the probability of friction with Japan than all the naval and military preparations we shall make against her.

It is said, however, that we must enormously increase our Navy if we are to protect our interests in the Panama Canal. Before the Canal was constructed the argument ran quite the other way. The construction of the Canal was so to facilitate the passage of our fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific, or the reverse, that it would double the efficiency of the fleet, and constitute an asset of incalculable value in the event of war. Now, however, it has become merely an extension of our coast line, a vulnerable point which it is essential to take extraordinary precautions to protect. If this is true, we have gained only a military liability by the construction of the Canal, having admitted the merchant vessels of all nations to the Canal on a parity with our own. Proximity to the Canal is our only advantage over other nations so far as our foreign commerce is concerned. If it is to take a huge navy to protect it so that it may be used for the passage of our fleets in time of war, there would seem to have been little net gain from a military point of view. Should we not be far better off if, having made this splendid contribution to the commerce of the world, we should now completely neutralize the Canal, under international guaranties, in which we should invite all civilized nations to join? The basis of the agreement might be either the closing of the Canal to the warships of belligerent nations, or the opening of the Canal to all belligerents alike, upon the condition that no encounter should be permitted to take place within a specified distance from either entrance. The practicability of this plan would necessarily depend upon the extent to which the Canal could be secured from injury or a surprise attack from some belligerent who did not respect its obligations. Either plan would probably result in greater protection of our interests in the Canal than any security derived from the size of the fleet available for its defense in the event of war between the United States and any first-class naval power.

But the necessity of naval protection for the Canal must be considered in the light of Gen. Goethals's testimony before the subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. Gen. Goethals testified that on the assumption that the naval contest had been ended, and that the control of the sea rested with the enemy, so that the enemy's transports were free

and able to land troops, a force of 25,000 men with proper land defenses would be able to hold off an invading expedition against the Panama Canal at least as long as the time that was necessary for the capture of Port Arthur. If this be true, it would seem clear that the defense of the Panama Canal would necessitate no departure from the defensive naval policy in which the submarine would largely replace the dreadnaught and the battle cruiser. The Canal is peculiarly adapted for defense by submarines, and there is a difference of expert opinion as to whether its land defenses should not be confined to defense against raids.

It will naturally be said that even if we abandon the policy of extending our commercial interests by force or by the show of force other nations will not do so, and unless we are prepared to assert our rights in foreign lands our financial interests will suffer, our pride be humbled, and our people be humiliated and abused. There are cases in which we must be prepared to send warships into foreign seas to enforce respect for the flag of the United States and for those who are entitled to its protection. The policies I am suggesting would never leave this country without a Navy containing sufficient warships to compel the respect of or to punish those inferior nations from which we need have any apprehension of wanton insult or ill treatment of our nationals. No civilized nation of consequence would in time of peace refuse atonement for insult or injury to any of our people. We may conclusively assume that every reparation would be made, and every precaution would be taken against the repetition of such an incident. Nothing but the willingness of the offending nation to proceed to war would call for a larger Navy than we should have; and our naval policies in the event of war would depend upon, and be determined by, the larger considerations to which I have referred. Assuming that we were protected at home against invasion, we might effectively resort to other weapons than the use of force. There are some conceptions of national honor and of what is essential for its vindication that are reminiscent of the *code duello*; but they can not long survive that discredited institution.

To the contention that we must have a navy adequate to protect our foreign trade and keep open the highways of commerce, it seems sufficient to reply that unless we develop a real merchant marine our foreign commerce would be carried on neutral ships; that no blockade of our extensive coasts could be made effective; and that nothing but the dominion of the seas could give us an assurance of uninterrupted foreign trade if private commerce is not to be safe under the sanctions of international law. General Greene has aptly said:

We do not need and will not have in this country an army of seven hundred thousand men, as some ill-balanced enthusiasts demand; we are not compelled to and we will not enter the battleship race of England and Germany. England must run this race or die. We are not so situated, and it would be supreme folly for us to waste our resources or our thoughts on any such contest.

But a defensive military policy does not assume a policy of international isolation. If there is anything which this war and the issues arising out of this war have made clear, it is that no nation can longer live unto itself, and least of all that a great commercial nation like the United States can refrain from active and direct participation in the determination of those policies and the creation of those agencies by which law is to be substituted for war and the

peaceful development of the world is to be assured. The peaceful development of the United States is indissolubly linked with the peaceful development of Europe and the world. We can no longer refrain from alliances because they may involve us in issues from which, thus far, we have happily been free. We must take our place in the family of nations and assume our full measure of responsibility. Nor need we despair of making substantial progress toward the substitution of peaceful means for the settlement of international differences by force of arms.

The declaration of President Wilson with regard to Pan Americanism in his annual message should serve the useful purpose of directing public attention to the inapplicability of the old conceptions of the Monroe doctrine to existing conditions. If this nation is really definitely to abandon the rôle "which it was always difficult to maintain without offense to the pride of the peoples whose freedom of action we sought to protect, and without provoking serious misconceptions of our motives," and is to interpret the Monroe Doctrine as an invitation to "a full and honorable association, as of partners, between ourselves and our neighbors, in the interest of all America, north and south," it marks a tremendous forward step in the national policies of the United States. It must not be forgotten, however, that the invitation has not yet been accepted, and, above all, that it has not yet been embodied in any international undertakings that can be regarded as a substitute for the doctrine of Monroe.

The President's message is admirable so far as it goes, but it leaves unanswered the question as to what this country would propose to do in any of the contingencies to which I have referred. Are we to have a defensive alliance with the Latin-American nations, and if so, upon what mutual terms and conditions? Can we, and shall we, make a real start toward "the parliament of man, the federation of the world," by a Pan American alliance in the interests of peace? Undoubtedly there never was an opportunity so favorable as this; and why should we not press home our opportunity by inaugurating that League to Enforce Peace, which is the most practical of all the suggestions that have thus far been made for the substitution of law for war by international agreement?

I trust that the Chamber of Commerce of the United States will seize the opportunity which is peculiarly within its grasp. Never, it seems to me, was anything more timely than the referendum which is now being taken by that great national association of the business interests of America. I think it is safe to assume that few, indeed, in this audience are aware of an event which is almost epochal in its importance.

On the 2d day of September, 1915, a Special Committee of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, composed of men of large business experience, representing commercial institutions of the highest and most conservative standing, unanimously recommended that Congress and the President be called upon to do all in their power to promote the establishment of:

1. A more comprehensive and better-defined sea law.
2. An International Court.
3. A Council of Conciliation.
4. International Conferences for the better establishment and progressive amendment of International Law.

5. The organization of a System of Commercial and Financial Non-Inter-course, to be followed by military force, if necessary, to be applied to those nations entering into the foregoing arrangements and then going to war without first submitting their differences to an agreed-upon tribunal.¹

The first four of these recommendations are regarded as based upon considerations so convincing that the committee appointed to formulate arguments against the recommendations involved, so that all phases of the question should be presented on the taking of the referendum, said:

It is assumed that the first four proposals of the committee are directed to conditions so well understood that the agreement about the answers to them is so nearly universal as to render unnecessary any attempt to formulate objections to them.

As to the fifth proposal, the committee which is in charge of the referendum vote states that it involves the adoption of a new principle "which, however moderate in its immediate form, may be regarded as a departure from accepted rules of conduct in international law"; and it sets forth a number of objections, which it says "may be deserving of attention."

All of these objections, however, were met in advance in the unanimous report of the special committee. Having already pointed out that "the problem of securing peace and justice among nations is simply an extension of what we have successfully solved in the national and municipal realms," and that international conferences have already secured results of the greatest importance for the peace and progress of the world, the committee expresses the opinion that—

This movement toward international agreement and law was gaining in strength each year. Stopped by the war, there is little doubt that it will revive stronger, and pursue its course in a more regular and systematic way when the war is over. Business men perhaps more than others should be anxious to support such endeavors for a better understanding among nations, establishing more firmly enlightened standards to govern their interrelations and furnishing a more elaborate and organic body of international public and administrative law. The present war has again incontrovertibly shown the fundamental need for this. The problem is, then, not new or novel, but needs only to be broadened and organized to yield all the desired benefits. * * * There is a difference of opinion as to the employment of force to compel any signatory nation to submit its cause to an international tribunal before going to war. Your Committee, however, believes that the great majority of the practical men of the United States who hold themselves responsible for reasonable progress see the necessity of the employment of an adequate pressure or force to compel signatory nations to bring their cause before an International Court or Council of Conciliation before going to war; because however desirable it may be, theoretically, not to use force, yet the history of the last 100 years, the many wars during that time, and the events of the present war have made apparent the fundamental need of an international power to enforce the submission of international disputes to a court. The alternative is constantly recurring wars, and, in the interval between these wars, the increasing absorption in preparation for war of the resources of the principal nations of the world.

The committee demonstrates the wisdom and the practicability of the use of economic pressure as a preliminary to the use of force, and point out that, while such pressure involves economic loss to the

¹ The preliminary count of the votes of the constituent members of the national chamber on this referendum, announced on January 5, 1916, showed the following results: Proposition 1: 763 in favor, 29 opposed; proposition 2: 753 in favor, 21 opposed; proposition 3: 744 in favor, 28 opposed; proposition 4: 769 in favor, 13 opposed; proposition 5(a): 556 in favor, 157 opposed (economic pressure); proposition 5(b): 452 in favor, 249 opposed (military force).

nations that apply it, "war, too, is costly and self-injurious to the nations which essay it."

Your Committee has studied sympathetically the arguments of those who, on principle, oppose all force, even to enforce law instead of war; likewise, the argument of those who respect the tradition that the United States should "keep free of entangling alliances." It must be conceded that the latter described a past policy under which our nation has grown in prosperity and happiness. But your Committee is forced to see that our country is already directly involved in the present war, because the lives and prosperity of American citizens have been involved, and because the future peace and prosperity of our country will be involved in the settlement of the war.

Your Committee believes that American citizens, realizing the world's imperative need of the substitution of law for war, if militarism is not to dominate, are ready, nay, feel it the clear call of duty, to take their share of the work and responsibility necessary to establish this substitution. We can not escape if we would, we would not if we could; the call of women and children, of the helpless and the weak, suffering indescribably from needless war, is an irresistible compulsion to all Americans, and, not least, to American business men. * * *

Knowing that civilization is made up of the work and suffering and martyrdoms of the past, we are willing, yes, anxious, to "pay back," in kind if necessary, what we are enjoying, if thereby we can help on this greatest forward step of civilization—the substitution of law for war. Your Committee believes that the time is ripe, as never before, for the fundamental advance in civilization that the establishing of an International Court and Council represents. * * * Your Committee believes that it is practically possible that the time has arrived, if the United States will but do its share of the work. There is little real hope for success if the United States is not a part of it. * * * If, at the close of the war there exists the legalized purpose of the United States to join in the work needed to enforce peace, there will be a most practical reason to expect success for this so necessary step forward. In fact, the beginning of the necessary organization may be in existence at that time, by reason of the agreement between the United States and some of the neutral nations of South America and Europe. It is a great opportunity, perhaps the greatest that has ever come to any nation. It is a great adventure practically within our power to promote—an enterprise that appeals to all that is best in us—an opportunity we will not miss.

Remember these are not the words and this is not the action of a body of visionary enthusiasts; it is the unanimous recommendation of a special committee of the greatest commercial body in this country, appointed "to examine into the relations between the present war and business, and submit suggestions as to the future." Nor is it the only indication of the progress of higher ideals in international relations.

There is a dispatch which was sent by Sir Edward Grey to Sir Edward Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, at the very crisis of the diplomatic interchanges which preceded the war, which I have read and reread with mingled feelings of sadness and hope. It has always seemed to me the most tragic of all the official documents which have been published by the warring nations, and, at the same time, the most encouraging. Just as it seemed inevitable that the explosion would occur, that the catastrophe must happen, after the suggestions and countersuggestions, the complaints and countercomplaints had been discussed under the forms and usages of diplomacy, Sir Edward Grey struck a new note that went straight to the heart of the underlying cause of all the difficulty. On July 30, 1914, he authorized Sir Edward Goschen to say to the German Chancellor:

If the peace of Europe can be preserved and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement, to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy

would be pursued against her or her allies, by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals; but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite *rapprochement* between the powers than has been possible hitherto.

Sir Edward Grey did not indicate exactly what he had in mind, but with the fate of Europe trembling in the balance, Utopia seemed nearer and more practically available than had seemed possible before. It was to be "some more definite *rapprochement* between the powers than has been possible hitherto"—some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies "by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately." Oh, the pity that Utopia had not seemed nearer a little while before; that this dispatch should have waited for "this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations." What a tragedy that it should have been received by a chancellor who heard it without comment "because His Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier."

That dispatch has not yet been answered. The German Chancellor asked for and received a copy as a memorandum, as "he would like to reflect on it before giving an answer." He has had much time and much occasion to reflect. That dispatch will be unanswered at the close of the war. The future of mankind depends upon the spirit in which its discussion is resumed, and upon the conditions which then exist. After this present conflict, so much more destructive and appalling than any that Europe has gone through, why should not the United States hold open a road that will at least lead toward Utopia by adopting the suggestions on which the members of the national Chamber of Commerce are now voting—by having in existence the beginning of a League to Enforce Peace by agreements then already made between the United States and some of the neutral nations of South America and Europe? *Si vis pacem para pacem*. If we wish *peace* let us *prepare* for *peace*.



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